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Can intergenerational equity be operationalized?
WILLIAM R. ZAME
Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles
A long Utilitarian tradition has the ideal of equal regard for all individuals, both
those now living and those yet to be born. The literature formalizes this ideal
as asking for a preference relation on the space of inﬁnite utility streams that
is complete, transitive, invariant to ﬁnite permutations, and respects the Pareto
ordering; an ethical preference relation, for short. This paper argues that oper-
ationalizing this ideal is problematic. Most simply, every ethical preference re-
lation has the property that almost all (in the sense of outer measure) pairs of
utility streams are indifferent. Even if we abandon completeness and respect for
the Pareto ordering, every irreﬂexive preference relation that is invariant to ﬁnite
permutationshasthepropertythatalmostallpairsofutilitystreamsareincompa-
rable(notstrictlyranked). Moreover, noethicalpreferencerelationismeasurable.
As a consequence, the existence of an ethical preference relation is independent
of the axioms used in almost all of formal economics and all of classical analysis.
Finally, even if an ethical preference relation exists, it cannot be “explicitly de-
scribed.” These results have implications for game theory, for macroeconomics,
and for economic development.
KEYWORDS. Intergenerational equity, inﬁnite utility streams, long run averages,
overtaking criterion, Utilitarianism.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A long Utilitarian tradition has the ideal of equal regard for all individuals—those now
livingandthosenotyetborn. AsSidgwick(1907,p.424)argues: “thetimeatwhichaman
exists cannot affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view ... the in-
terests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much as those of his contemporaries.”
Similarly, Ramsey (1928) asserts that any argument for preferring one generation over
another must arise “merely from the weakness of the imagination,” and Rawls (1971)
makes similar arguments. The literature formalizes this goal by asking for a complete
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transitive preference relation on the space of inﬁnite utility streams (utilities of current
and future individuals or of current and future generations) that is invariant under per-
muting the utility of any two individuals or generations (displays intergenerational eq-
uity) and respects the Pareto ordering—an ethical preference relation, for short.
This paper argues that operationalizing this ideal is problematic. Most simply (The-
orem1),everyethicalpreferencerelationhasthepropertythatalmostall(inthesenseof
outer measure) pairs of utility streams are indifferent. Indeed, even if we abandon com-
pleteness and respect for the Pareto ordering, every irreﬂexive preference relation that
displays intergenerational equity has the property that almost all pairs of utility streams
are incomparable (not strictly ranked). More subtly (Theorem 2), no ethical preference
relationismeasurable. Asaconsequence(Theorem3), theexistenceofacompletetran-
sitive preference relation that displays intergenerational equity and respects the Pareto
ordering is independent of the axioms used in almost all of formal economics and all of
classical analysis. (These are the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms, which formalize naive set
theory in a consistent way, avoiding paradoxes such as the set of sets that are not ele-
ments of themselves, and the Axiom of Dependent Choice, which asserts the possibility
of making a sequence of choices, each choice depending on the previous choices—but
not the full Axiom of Choice.1) Moreover (Theorem 4), even if such a preference relation
exists, it cannot be “explicitly described.”
These results can also be interpreted in the context of repeated games (and in
macroeconomics and in economic development), with respect to the question of mod-
eling the preferences of an agent (or a planner) over an inﬁnite stream of payoffs. The
usual assumptions are that preferences are increasing (high payoffs are preferred to low
payoffs) and display impatience (high payoffs are preferred soon rather than late); the
discounted sum of utilities for period payoffs is the canonical example of a preference
relation with these properties. But how should we model the preferences of an agent
who is perfectly patient—indifferent to the order in which payoffs arrive, or at least to
the order inwhich any ﬁnite sequenceof payoffs arrive? Requiringthatpreferences over
inﬁnite utility streams be increasing and display perfect patience is formally equivalent
to requiring that they respect the Pareto ordering and display intergenerational equity,
so precisely the same conclusions as above obtain.
Thispapercontributestoasubstantialliterature. Diamond(1965)showsthatacom-
plete transitive preference relation that displays intergenerational equity and respects
the Pareto ordering cannot be continuous in the topology induced by the supremum
norm. Basu and Mitra (2003) show that such a preference relation—whether continu-
ousornot—cannotberepresentedbya(real-valued)utilityfunction. Ontheotherhand,
Svensson (1980) proves that such preference relations do exist.2
A sketch of Svensson’s argument will help to place the results of the present paper
in context. Write X = [0,1]N for the space of utility streams and deﬁne an incomplete
1Perhaps the most important uses of the full Axiom of Choice in economics are through applications of
non-standard analysis; see Anderson (1991) and Anderson and Raimondo (2005) for example.
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preference relation  on X in the following way: y  x exactly when there is a ﬁnite
permutation y ∗ of y (that is a reordering of ﬁnitely many of the terms of y) such that
y ∗ > x (i.e., y ∗ ≥ x and y ∗ 6= x). The relation  is irreﬂexive, transitive, displays in-
tergenerational equity and respects the Pareto ordering, but it is incomplete: some—
indeed, many—pairs of utility streams are not comparable. However we can use Szpil-
rajn’s (1930) extension lemma to ﬁnd an extension  of  to a complete transitive pref-
erence relation on X. This extension  automatically displays intergenerational equity
and respects the Pareto ordering; i.e., it is an ethical preference relation.
To relate this argument to the results of this paper, begin by noticing that the set of
pairs (x,y) ∈ X ×X = [0,1]N ×[0,1]N for which y > x has measure 0 (with respect to the
productofLebesguemeasureonallfactors). Becausethereareonlyacountablenumber
of ﬁnite permutations of the integers N, it follows that the set of pairs (x,y) ∈ X ×X =
[0,1]N×[0,1]N for which y x or x y also has measure 0, so the complementary set of
pairs (x,y) that are incomparable has measure 1. Theorem 1 asserts that all irreﬂexive
preference relations that display intergenerational equity share this property.
As noted above, the existence of an extension of the incomplete relation  to a com-
pleterelationdependsonSzpilrajn’sextensionlemma;theproofofthelatterresultde-
pendsontheAxiomofChoice. Theorem3assertsthatrelianceontheAxiomofChoiceis
unavoidable.3 The proof of this result relies on Theorem 2, which asserts that no ethical
preference relation is measurable. (At the same time as this paper was originally circu-
lated, Lauwers (2006) circulated a very different proof of a similar independence result,
but for a restricted domain. Lauwers’ work relies on inﬁnite Ramsey theory rather than
on measure theory.) Finally, Theorem 4 provides a formal meaning for the idea that
reliance on the Axiom of Choice means that no ethical preference relation can be “ex-
plicitly described.”
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents the
formalstructureandmakestheconnectionsbetweenintergenerationalequityandmea-
sure for incomplete preference relations (Theorem 1). Section 3 specializes to complete
preference relations and shows that no ethical preference relation is measurable (Theo-
rem 2). Section 4 discusses the meaning of independence and of “explicit constructibil-
ity” and establishes the independence result (Theorem 3) and the non-constructibility
result (Theorem 4). Finally, Section 5 presents similar results (Theorems 1–4) for a re-
stricted domain.
2. UTILITY STREAMS, PREFERENCES AND MEASURE
Toﬁxideasandnotation, considerinﬁniteutilitystreamsx =(x1,x2,...)indexedbytime
and viewed as utilities of successive generations, so that xn is the utility of generation
n. Write x ≥ y if xn ≥ yn for all n, x > y if x ≥ y but x 6= y, and x  y if xn > yn
for all n. Write N for the set of natural numbers (positive integers). I assume here that
the possible range of utilities in each period contains the interval [0,1], so the space of
utility streams contains X = [0,1]N. (Section 5 addresses preference relations on more
3This conﬁrms a conjecture of Fleurbaey and Michel (2003).190 William R. Zame Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
restricted domains.) Note that negative results for preference relations on X certainly
entail negative results for preference relations on larger domains.
ByaﬁnitepermutationImeanapermutationσ :N→Nthatdiffersfromtheidentity
only on a ﬁnite set. Write F for the group of ﬁnite permutations, and F2 for the subset
of permutations that interchange two elements of N and are the identity elsewhere. For
σ ∈F, deﬁne Tσ :X →X by Tσ(x)n =xσ(n).
Although we are most interested in complete preference relations, it is convenient
to begin by thinking about incomplete preference relations. Say that an irreﬂexive pref-
erence relation  on X displays intergenerational equity if it is invariant under permuta-
tions in F, in the sense that for all x,y ∈X and all σ,τ∈F we have
y x ⇐⇒ Tτ(y)Tσ(x).
Because every permutation in F is the composition of permutations in F2, a transitive
irreﬂexive relation is invariant under permutations in F exactly when it is invariant un-
der permutations in F2, so for transitive relations the deﬁnition given is consistent with
the discussion in the Introduction.
The Introduction gives one example of an incomplete preference relation that dis-
plays intergenerational equity; the literature provides a number of other (perhaps more
familiar) examples:


























δiyi for all δ ∈(δ0,1).
Thesepreferencerelationssharethefeaturethattheyareincomplete;indeed,mostpairs
are incomparable. As shown below, this conclusion is inescapable.
To formalize this statement, we need a natural measure on utility streams. To this
end, write λ for Lebesgue measure on (Borel subsets of) [0,1]. Let Λ be the inﬁnite prod-
uct measure on (Borel subsets of) X = [0,1]N, and let Λ = Λ×Λ be the product measureTheoretical Economics 2 (2007) Intergenerational equity 191
on(Borelsubsetsof)X×X =[0,1]N×[0,1]N. Recallthatinnermeasure andoutermeasure
are deﬁned for arbitrary subsets E ⊂X ×X by
Λin(E)=sup{Λ(B): B Borel, B ⊂ E}
Λout(E)=inf{Λ(B): B Borel, B ⊃ E}.
Both the sup and inf above are attained; that is, for each E ⊂ X ×X there are Borel sets
Ein ⊂ E and Eout ⊃ E such that Λ(Ein) = Λin(E) and Λ(Eout) = Λout(E). The subset E ⊂
X ×X ismeasurable ifitsinnerandoutermeasuresareequal(Λin(E)=Λout(E)), inwhich
case we write Λ(E) for the common value.
The basic result is the following.




{(x,y):x 6y and y 6x}

=1.
PROOF. Deﬁne an inversion
ι :X ×X →X ×X




I ={(x,y):x 6y and y 6x}.
Evidently R, L, and I are disjoint and their union is X ×X. Notice that Λout(I)=1 exactly
when Λin(R) = Λin(L) = 0. Because ι is measure-preserving and ι(R) = L, it is enough to
prove that Λin(R)=0.
There is a Borel set Rin ⊂R such that Λ(Rin)=Λin(R). For each σ,τ∈F, write
Rστ
in ={(Tσ(x),Tτ(y)):(x,y)∈Rin}
and note that Rστ






Because A is the countable union of Borel sets, it also is a Borel set. Intergenerational
equityofguaranteesthatRστ
in ⊂R foreachσ,τ,soA ⊂R. Theconstructionguarantees
that A is invariant, in the sense that
(x,y)∈A, σ,τ∈F⇒(Tσ(x),Tτ(y))∈A.
Because Rin ⊂A ⊂R and Λ(Rin)=Λin(R), it follows that Λ(Rin)=Λ(A)=Λin(R).192 William R. Zame Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
For each x ∈ X, write Ax = {y ∈ X : (x,y) ∈ A} for the vertical section. Note that each






By construction each vertical section is invariant under each Tσ; that is,
y ∈Ax,σ ∈F⇒Tσ(y)∈Ax.
The Hewitt–Savage 0–1 law (Billingsley 1995, p. 496) asserts that every measurable sub-
setofX thatisinvariantundereachTσ hasmeasureeither0or1,soeachAx hasmeasure
either 0 or 1.
Now write
X0 ={x ∈X :Λ(Ax)=0}, X1 ={x ∈X :Λ(Ax)=1}
The sets X0,X1 are disjoint Borel sets and their union is X (because each Ax has measure








The ﬁrst integral is 0 (because the integrand is identically 0) and the second integral is
Λ(X1) (because the integrand is identically 1), so Λ(X1)=Λ(A).
On the other hand, suppose x ∈ X and σ ∈ F. If y ∈ Ax then by deﬁnition (x,y) ∈
A and our construction guarantees that (Tσ(x),y) ∈ A. Hence Ax ⊂ ATσ(x). Similarly,
ATσ(x) ⊂ ATσ−1(Tσ(x)) = Ax. That is, Ax = ATσ(x). In particular, if x ∈ X1 then Λ(ATσ(x)) =
Λ(Ax) = 1 so Tσ(x) ∈ X1. That is, X1 is invariant under Tσ for each σ ∈ F. Another
application of the Hewitt–Savage 0–1 law implies that X1 has measure either 0 or 1.
Because Λ(X1) = Λ(A) = Λin(R), it follows that Λin(R) is either 0 or 1. However,
Λ(X ×X) ≥ Λin(R) + Λin(L) and Λin(R) = Λin(R). Thus, if Λin(R) = 1 then Λ(X × X) ≥ 2.
Because Λ is a probability measure, this is impossible, so we conclude that Λin(R) =
Λin(L)=0 and hence that Λout(I)=1, as asserted. 
3. NON-MEASURABILITY
We now turn our attention to complete, transitive preference relations. Say that a com-
plete transitive preference relation  displays intergenerational equity exactly when its
irreﬂexivepartdoesso. Inviewofourearlierdiscussion,thismeansthatforallx,y ∈X
and all σ,τ∈F (or just all σ,τ∈F2) we have
y x ⇐⇒ Tτ(y)Tσ(x).
It is easily checked that  displays intergenerational equity if and only if it has the prop-
erty
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A preference relation respects the weak Pareto ordering if y  x implies y  x. A com-
plete transitive (weak) preference relation on X is ethical if it displays intergenerational
equity and respects the weak Pareto ordering.
Say that the preference relation  is measurable if its graph
G ={(x,y)∈X ×X :y x}
is a measurable subset of X ×X.
THEOREM 2. No ethical preference relation on X =[0,1]N is measurable.
PROOF. Suppose, to the contrary,  is an ethical preference relation on [0,1]N whose




I ={(x,y):x 6y and y 6x}={(x,y):x ∼y}.
Note that I = G ∩ι(G), R = G \I, and L = ι(R), so that R, L, and I are all measurable. It
follows from Theorem 1 that Λ(R)=Λ(L)=0 and Λ(I)=1.
Proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 1, construct a Borel set J ⊂ I such that Λ(J)=
1 and
(x,y)∈ J,σ,τ∈F⇒(Tσ(x),Tτ(y))∈ J.





Because Λ(J)=1, it follows that Λ(Jx)=1 for almost every x ∈X; ﬁx any x∗ ∈X for which
Λ(Jx∗)=1.












and deﬁne a map f :D →X by
f (x)n =xn +
1−bn
2
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It is easily checked that f is one-to-one, measurable, and measure-preserving; hence
Λ(f (D ∩ Jx∗))=Λ(D ∩ Jx∗). Our construction guarantees that Λ(Jx∗)=1 and Λ(D)>
1
2, so
Λ(D)=Λ(D ∩ Jx∗)=Λ(f (D ∩ Jx∗))>
1
2.
However, if y ∈ (D ∩ Jx∗) then f (y)  y, so f (y)  y, whence f (y)  x∗. Thus (D ∩ Jx∗)
and f (D ∩ Jx∗) are disjoint. Hence
Λ(X)≥Λ
 















Because Λ is a probability measure, we have reached a contradiction, so the proof is
complete. 
4. INDEPENDENCE AND DEFINABILITY
To understand what independence means, it is useful to recall some mathematical
logic.4 A language L consists of the usual logical symbols together with a set of con-
stant symbols, a set of relation symbols, and a set of function symbols. Given a set of
sentences A in the language L, we can use the usual logical rules of inference to de-
rive/prove other sentences. A set of sentences A is consistent if no contradiction can
be derived from it; that is, there is no sentenceQ with the property that bothQ and the
negation ofQ can be derived from A .
A model for the language L consists of an underlying set M and an interpretation of
allthesymbolsof L. TheCompletenessTheoremassertsthatasetofsentencesA inthe
language L is consistent if and only if there is a model M of L in which all the sentences
of A are true. Assuming A is consistent, a sentence P is provable from A if and only
if P is true in every model, and the negation of P is provable from A if and only if P is
false in every model. The sentence P is independent of A (or undecidable on the basis
of A ) if neither P nor its negation can be derived from A . Thus, P is independent of
A if and only if there is a model in which the sentences of A are true and P is true and
a model in which the sentences of A are true but P is false.
To make all this concrete, consider the familiar language of Euclidean geometry and
the sentences that constitute the familiar axioms and postulates of Euclidean geome-
try. The ordinary plane, with the usual interpretations, is a model of this language, and
the familiar axioms and postulates are true in this model, so Euclidean geometry is con-
sistent. A different model (spherical geometry) is obtained by taking the sphere (rather
than the plane) as the underlying set, and interpreting a “line” as a great circle on the
surface of the sphere. In spherical geometry, all the usual axioms and postulates of Eu-
clidean geometry are true except the Parallel Postulate, which asserts that through every
point not on a given line there is exactly one line parallel to the given line. (Through
4ChangandKeisler(1992),Jech(1978),andWeissandD’Mello(1997)provideconvenientreferences; the
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any point not on a given great circle, there are no great circles parallel to the given great
circle.) Hence the Parallel Postulate is independent of the other axioms and postulates.5
An example more relevant to the present work concerns the existence of non-
measurablesets. Afamiliarconstruction(duetoVitali)showsthattheZermelo–Fraenkel
Axioms together with the Axiom of Choice imply the existence of sets of real numbers
that are not Lebesgue measurable. In particular, it follows that in every model of set the-
ory in which the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms and the Axiom of Choice are true, there exist
non-measurable sets.
However, the full power of the Axiom of Choice is almost never used in formal eco-
nomics or in classical analysis for that matter. What is used is a much weaker axiom, the
Axiom of Dependent Choice. The formal statements of these axioms follow.






such that f (X)∈X for each X ∈X .
Axiom of Dependent Choice Let X be a non-empty set and let R be an entire relation
on X (that is, a binary relation such that for eachx ∈X there is a y ∈X withx R y).
Then there is a function f :N→X such that f (n)R f (n +1) for each n ∈N.
To understand the difference between these two axioms, note that if we are given a
set X and an entire relation R on X, the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms by themselves guar-
antee that for every natural number N there is a function f : {1,...,N} → X for which
f (n)R f (n +1) for n =1,...,N −1. That is, the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms—without any
additionalchoiceaxiomwhatsoever—alreadyguaranteetheexistenceofarbitrarilylong
ﬁnite sequences for which f (n)R f (n +1); the Axiom of Dependent Choice merely guar-
antees the existence of an inﬁnite sequence for which f (n)R f (n +1). By contrast, the
Axiom of Choice guarantees the existence of an arbitrarily large family of simultaneous
choices.
The Axiom of Dependent Choice is exactly what is needed to carry out many of the
familiar constructions of classical analysis—for example, the proof that a bounded se-
quence of real numbers contains a convergent subsequence.
As noted above, the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms together with the Axiom of Choice
imply the existence of non-measurable sets. On the other hand, Solovay (1970) con-
structs a model M1 of set theory in which the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms and the Axiom
of Dependent Choice are true and in which all sets of real numbers are Lebesgue mea-
surable.6 Hence the existence of a non-measurable set of real numbers is independent
of the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms together with the Axiom of Dependent Choice.
5The reader may recall that, until the early part of the 19th century, many mathematicians believed that
the Parallel Postulate could be derived from other axioms and postulates. Spherical geometry, which was
invented by Bolyai, and hyperbolic geometry, which was invented by Lobachevsky, show that this belief
was mistaken.
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Theexistenceofnon-measurablesetsisrelevantinthepresentcontextbecauseThe-
orem 2 guarantees that no ethical preference relation on X = [0,1]N is measurable. Put
differently, the existence of an ethical preference relation on X = [0,1]N entails the exis-
tence of a non-measurable subset of X ×X, and hence, as we shall show, the existence of
a non-measurable subset of R. It follows that in Solovay’s model M1 there does not exist
an ethical preference relation on X, and hence that the existence of ethical preference
relations on X is independent. The formal statement and proof are as follows.
THEOREM 3. The existence of an ethical preference relation on X =[0,1]N is independent
of the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms and the Axiom of Dependent Choice.
PROOF. We need to exhibit two models: (i) a model in which the Zermelo–Fraenkel
AxiomsandtheAxiomofDependentChoicearetrueandinwhichthereexistsanethical
preference relation on X = [0,1]N; (ii) a model in which the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms
andtheAxiomofDependentChoicearetrueandinwhichtheredoesnotexistanethical
preference relation on X = [0,1]N. In view of Svensson’s theorem, for the ﬁrst model we
can take any model in which the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms and the Axiom of Choice are
true. For the second model, we take Solovay’s (1970) model M1.
To show that in M1 there is no ethical preference relation on [0,1]N, suppose to the
contrary that such a relation  exists. In view of Theorem 2, the graph G of  is a non-
measurable subset of [0,1]N × [0,1]N. To obtain a contradiction, it is enough to show
that this implies the existence of a non-measurable subset of R. Although this is an
immediate consequence of a theorem of Maharam (1942) characterizing complete non-
atomic probability spaces, an elementary argument (which will also be useful later) is
available for the case at hand.















Let F be the set of elements of [0,1] whose binary expansions are eventually constant
(i.e., end in an inﬁnite string of 0’s or an inﬁnite string of 1’s); note that F is a countable
set. Set X∗ = ([0,1]\ F)N, Y ∗ = Φ(X∗ ×X∗), and G = [0,1]\Y ∗; let Φ∗ be the restriction
of Φ to X∗ × X∗. Note that G consists of those elements s ∈ [0,1] for which one of a
countable number of particular subsequences of the binary expansion of s ends in an
inﬁnite string of 0’s or an inﬁnite string of 1’s; hence λ(G) = 0 and λ(Y ∗) = 1. Because F
is countable, Λ(F)=0 and Λ((X ×X)\(X∗ ×X∗))=0.
It is easily seen that Φ∗ is one-to-one, onto, measurable with a measurable in-
verse, and measure-preserving. If G ⊂ X × X is not measurable then neither is G ∗ =
the existence of a model of one set of axioms and constructs a model of another set of axioms. Such rela-
tivism is unavoidable, because a theorem of Gödel shows that no reasonably strong system of axioms can
prove its own consistency. In this case, Solovay assumes the existence of a model in which the Zermelo–
Fraenkel Axioms, the Axiom of Choice, and a “large cardinal axiom” are true and deduces the existence of
a model in which the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms and the Axiom of Dependent Choice are true and in which
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G ∩((X ×X)\(X∗ ×X∗)). Hence Φ∗(G ∗) is a non-measurable subset of Y ∗, and thus of
[0,1].
To summarize: the existence of an ethical preference relation on X = [0,1]N entails
the existence of a non-measurable subset of [0,1]. Hence, in Solovay’s model M1, no
such preference relation exists, as was asserted. 
What does it mean to say that no ethical preference relation on [0,1]N can be “ex-
plicitly described”? An informal interpretation is that any proof of the existence of such
a preference relation must rely on the Axiom of Choice—but a formal interpretation of
the same idea can be based on the notion of deﬁnability.
A set A ⊂ R is deﬁnable if there is a set-theoretic formula Φ(t,r,α1,...,) in which r is
a real number, α1,..., is a sequence of ordinals, and t is the only free variable, such that
A ={t ∈R:Φ(t,r,α1,...)}.
Solovay (1970) shows that there is a model M2 of the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms together
with the Axiom of Choice in which every set of reals that is deﬁnable is Lebesgue mea-
surable. In the model M2 the Axiom of Choice is true, so in M2 there are subsets of R
that are non measurable—but such sets are not deﬁnable. Because there is a model in
which the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms together with the Axiom of Choice are true and all
deﬁnablesetsareLebesguemeasurable,itfollowsthattheproposition“thereexistsade-
ﬁnable set that is not Lebesgue measurable” is not provable from the Zermelo–Fraenkel
Axioms together with the Axiom of Choice. In different words: no deﬁnable set can be
proved (on the basis of the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms and the Axiom of Choice) to be
non-measurable.
Similarly, say that a set B ⊂ [0,1]N ×[0,1]N is deﬁnable if there is a set-theoretic for-
mula Φ(t,r,α1,...) in which r is a real number, α1,... is a sequence of ordinals, and t is
the only free variable, such that
B ={(x,y)∈[0,1]N×[0,1]N :Φ((x,y),r,α1,...)}.
Say that a preference relation  is deﬁnable if its graph
G ={(x,y)∈[0,1]N×[0,1]N :y x}
is a deﬁnable set. The next result shows that no deﬁnable preference relation on X =
[0,1]N can be proved to be ethical; in this sense, at least, no ethical preference relation
on X =[0,1]N can be “explicitly constructed.”
THEOREM 4. No deﬁnable preference relation on X =[0,1]N can be proved (on the basis of
the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms and the Axiom of Choice) to be ethical.
PROOF. Suppose that  is a deﬁnable preference relation on X = [0,1]N and that  can
be proved (on the basis of the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms and the Axiom of Choice) to be
ethical. By Theorem 2, the graph G of  is a non-measurable subset of X ×X. The argu-
ment of Theorem 3 together with a proof that  is ethical and the proof of Theorems 2198 William R. Zame Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
and 3 yield a deﬁnable subset Φ∗(G ∗) of R and a proof that that Φ∗(G ∗) is not Lebesgue
measurable. As we have noted above, if follows from Solovay (1970) that this is impossi-
ble. We have reached a contradiction so the proof is complete. 
5. RESTRICTED DOMAIN
A natural response to impossibility results in social choice is to look for restricted do-
mains on which possibility is restored. In the present instance, one might require that
each generation’s utility lies in a ﬁnite set, say {0,1}; see Basu and Mitra (2003) and Basu
andMitra(forthcoming)forinstance. Ifwemakethisrestriction,thentherelevantspace
of utility streams isZ ={0,1}N. However, the weak Pareto ordering is almost degenerate
on Z: if w,z ∈ Z and w  z then w = 1 and z = 0 (the constant sequences of all 1’s
and all 0’s, respectively). Hence a complete transitive preference relation  on Z that
displays intergenerational equity and respects the weak Pareto ordering can be deﬁned
by
1z for z 6=1
w ∼z for w,z 6=1.
However,ifweinsist,asseemsnaturalinthiscontext,thatpreferencesrespectthestrong
Pareto ordering, then conclusions parallel to those of Theorems 1–4 again emerge.
As for preference relations on X, say that an irreﬂexive (incomplete) preference rela-
tion  on Z displays intergenerational equity if it is invariant under permutations in F,
in the sense that for all z,w ∈Z and all σ,τ∈F we have
w z ⇐⇒ Tτ(w)Tσ(z).
As before, a transitive irreﬂexive relation is invariant under permutations in F exactly
when it is invariant under permutations in F2. Say that a complete transitive preference
relation  onZ displays intergenerational equity exactly when its irreﬂexive part  does.
Equivalently,  displays intergenerational equity if and only if it has the property
z ∈Z,σ ∈F2 ⇒z ∼Tσ(z).
The preference relation  respects the strong Pareto ordering if y > x implies y  x. Say
that a complete transitive preference relation on X is ethical if it displays intergenera-
tional equity and respects the strong Pareto ordering.
Letγbenormalizedcountingmeasureon{0,1},letΓbetheinﬁniteproductmeasure
on Z = {0,1}N, and let Γ = Γ×Γ be the product measure on Z ×Z. As before, say that a
preference relation  onZ is measurable if its graph
G ={(z,w)∈Z ×Z :w z}
is measurable with respect to Γ (i.e., its inner and outer measure coincide).
The following results are the parallels to Theorems 1–4 for relations on the restricted
domain Z = {0,1}N; because the proofs closely parallel the proofs of Theorems 1–4, I
give only sketches.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Intergenerational equity 199




{(z,w):z 6w and w 6z}

=1.
PROOF. The proof is almost the same as the proof of Theorem 1. Deﬁne an inversion
ι :Z ×Z →Z ×Z




I ={(z,w):z 6w and w 6z}.
Evidently, R, L, and I are disjoint and their union isZ ×Z. As in the proof of Theorem 1,
it is enough to prove that Λin(R)=0.
As in the proof of Theorem 1, construct a Borel set A ⊂ R that is invariant, in the
sense that
(z,w)∈A, σ,τ∈F⇒(Tσ(z),Tτ(w))∈A.
As in the proof of Theorem 1, Λ(Rin)=Λ(A)=Λ(R).
For each z ∈ Z, write Az = {w ∈ X : (z,w) ∈ A} for the vertical section. By con-
struction each vertical section is invariant under each Tσ. Use Fubini’s theorem and the
Hewitt–Savage 0–1 law to show that each Az has measure either 0 or 1.
Now write
Z0 ={z ∈Z :Γ(Az)=0}, Z1 ={z ∈Z :Γ(Az)=1}








The ﬁrst integral is 0 (because the integrand is identically 0) and the second integral is
Γ(Z1) (because the integrand is identically 1), so Γ(Z1)=Γ(A).
Now, arguing exactly as in Theorem 1, we can show that Z1 is invariant under Tσ
for each σ ∈ F. Another application of the Hewitt–Savage 0–1 law implies that Z1 has
measure either 0 or 1, and hence that R has inner measure either 0 or 1. Because R and
L havethesameinnermeasureandΓisaprobabilitymeasure,itfollowsthatR hasinner
measure 1, as asserted. 
THEOREM 20. No ethical preference relation onZ ={0,1}N is measurable.
PROOF. Suppose to the contrary that  is a measurable, ethical preference relation on
Z. Write
I ={(z,w)∈Z ×Z :w ∼z}.200 William R. Zame Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Arguing exactly as in the proof of Theorem 2, we can construct a Borel subset J ⊂ I such
that Γ(J) = Γ(I) and (w,z) ∈ J implies (Tσ(w),Tτ(w)) ∈ J for each σ,τ ∈ F. Continuing
to argue as in the proof of Theorem 2, we can show that Γ(J) = 1, and then that there is
some z∗ ∈Z for which Γ(Jz∗)=1.





0 if n =1 and z1 =1
1 if n =1 and z1 =0
zn if n 6=1.
(That is, g reverses the ﬁrst component of z.) It is evident that g is one-to-one, mea-
surable and measure-preserving. By assumption,  respects the strong Pareto ordering,
so if z1 = 0 then g(z) > z and g(z)  z, while if z1 = 1 then g(z) < z and z  g(z);
in either case, g(z) 6∼ z. Hence, if z ∈ Jz∗ then g(z) 6∼ z∗, so g(z) / ∈ Jz∗. It follows that
g(Jz∗)∩ Jz∗ = ;. Because g is measure-preserving and Γ(Jz∗) = 1, this is absurd, so we
have reached a contradiction and the proof is complete. 
THEOREM 30. The existence of an ethical preference relation onZ ={0,1}N is independent
of the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms and the Axiom of Dependent Choice.
PROOF. As in the proof of Theorem 3, it sufﬁces to show that the existence of a non-
measurable subset ofZ ×Z entails the existence of a non-measurable subset of [0,1].
Note ﬁrst that the map (z,w) 7→ (z1,w1,z2,w2,...) is a one-to-one, onto, and
measure-preserving map ofZ ×Z toZ. Hence the existence of a non-measurable subset
of Z ×Z entails the existence of a non-measurable subset of Z. Now let F ⊂ Z be the
set of sequences that are eventually constant (either eventually 0 or eventually 1) and let
G ⊂ [0,1] be the set of real numbers that have a binary expansion that ends in all 0’s or





That is, h maps the sequence z of 0’s and 1’s to the real number having z as its binary
expansion. It is easily seen that h is one-to-one, measurable (in fact continuous), and
measure-preserving,andthatitsinverseisalsomeasurable. Because F andG arecount-
able, Γ(F)=0andλ(G)=0. Hencetheexistenceofanon-measurablesubsetofZ entails
the existence of a non-measurable subset of [0,1], as required. 
THEOREM 40. No deﬁnable preference relation on Z = {0,1}N can be proved (on the basis
of the Zermelo–Fraenkel Axioms and the Axiom of Choice) to be ethical.
PROOF. Suppose  is a deﬁnable preference preference relation onZ ={0,1}N. By The-
orem 20, the graph of  is a non-measurable subset ofZ ×Z. A proof that the graph of 
is deﬁnable, together with the proofs of Theorems 20 and 30 provide a deﬁnable subset
of R and a proof that this set is non-measurable. In view of Solovay (1970), this is im-
possible. Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Intergenerational equity 201
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